Fixed LaTeX problems.

diff --git a/src/ECC.tex b/src/ECC.tex
index 347609a..c175cd5 100644 (file)
--- a/src/ECC.tex
+++ b/src/ECC.tex
@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@
 Elliptic Curve Cryptogaphy (simply called ECC from now on) is a branch of 
 cryptography that emerged in the mid-80ties. Like RSA and Diffie-Hellman 
 it's security is based on the discrete logarithm problem
-\footnote{url{http://www.mccurley.org/papers/dlog.pdf}} 
-\footnote{url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete_logarithm}}
-\footnote{url{http://mathworld.wolfram.com/EllipticCurve.html}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://www.mccurley.org/papers/dlog.pdf}} 
+\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete_logarithm}}
+\footnote{\url{http://mathworld.wolfram.com/EllipticCurve.html}}.
 Finding the descrete logarithm of an elliptic curve from it's public base
 point is thought to be infeaseble. This is known as the Elliptic Curve Descrete 
 Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). ECC and the underlying mechanisms are not easy 
 to understand - luckily there have been some great introductions on the topic lately
-\footnote{url{http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography}}
-\footnote{url{https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography}}
+\footnote{\url{https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html}}.
 
 ECC provides for much stronger security with less computonally expensive
 operations in comparison to traditional PKI algorithms. (See the section 
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ there has been a lot of discussion regarding these parameters. A part of the
 discussion involved recommended sets of curves and curve points chosen by
 different standardization bodies such as NIST. Those parameters came under
 question from various cryptographers
-\footnote{url{http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.09.16/slides-djb-20130916-a4.pdf}}
-\footnote{url{https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html#c1675929}}
-\footnote{url{crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/10263/should-we-trust-the-nist-recommended-ecc-parameters}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.09.16/slides-djb-20130916-a4.pdf}}
+\footnote{\url{https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html\#c1675929}}
+\footnote{\url{crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/10263/should-we-trust-the-nist-recommended-ecc-parameters}}.
 At the time of writing there is ongoing research as to the security of 
 various ECC parameters
-\footnote{url{safecurves.cr.yp.to}}.
+\footnote{\url{safecurves.cr.yp.to}}.
 The authors of this paper include configurations and recommendations
 with and without ECC - the reader may choose to adopt those settings
 as he finds best suited to his environment. The authors will not make

diff --git a/src/keylengths.tex b/src/keylengths.tex
index e382afd..3d79143 100644 (file)
--- a/src/keylengths.tex
+++ b/src/keylengths.tex
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ strong ciphers, fewer users
 MACs: Do not use SHA1. Why? XXX insert literature . BSI/ ENISA page XXX
 Chaining mode: CTR, GCM, CCM (in this order).  XXX add reference to literature XXX
 ciphers:     XXX add reference to literature XXX
-Key Exchange: ECDHE_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits) XXX FIXME: why? references to literature XXX
+Key Exchange: ECDHE\_RSA, DHE\_RSA, ECDHE\_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits) XXX FIXME: why? references to literature XXX
 
 
 \subsubsection{Configuration B}
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ weaker ciphers, more users.
 MACs: SHA1:  allowed
 Chaining mode: GCM, CCM, CBC.
 ciphers:    XXX add reference to literature XXX
-Key Exchange: ECDHE_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits)
+Key Exchange: ECDHE\_RSA, DHE\_RSA, ECDHE\_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits)