Elliptic Curve Cryptogaphy (simply called ECC from now on) is a branch of
cryptography that emerged in the mid-80ties. Like RSA and Diffie-Hellman
it's security is based on the discrete logarithm problem
-\footnote{url{http://www.mccurley.org/papers/dlog.pdf}}
-\footnote{url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete_logarithm}}
-\footnote{url{http://mathworld.wolfram.com/EllipticCurve.html}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://www.mccurley.org/papers/dlog.pdf}}
+\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete_logarithm}}
+\footnote{\url{http://mathworld.wolfram.com/EllipticCurve.html}}.
Finding the descrete logarithm of an elliptic curve from it's public base
point is thought to be infeaseble. This is known as the Elliptic Curve Descrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). ECC and the underlying mechanisms are not easy
to understand - luckily there have been some great introductions on the topic lately
-\footnote{url{http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography}}
-\footnote{url{https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography}}
+\footnote{\url{https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html}}.
ECC provides for much stronger security with less computonally expensive
operations in comparison to traditional PKI algorithms. (See the section
discussion involved recommended sets of curves and curve points chosen by
different standardization bodies such as NIST. Those parameters came under
question from various cryptographers
-\footnote{url{http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.09.16/slides-djb-20130916-a4.pdf}}
-\footnote{url{https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html#c1675929}}
-\footnote{url{crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/10263/should-we-trust-the-nist-recommended-ecc-parameters}}.
+\footnote{\url{http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.09.16/slides-djb-20130916-a4.pdf}}
+\footnote{\url{https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html\#c1675929}}
+\footnote{\url{crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/10263/should-we-trust-the-nist-recommended-ecc-parameters}}.
At the time of writing there is ongoing research as to the security of
various ECC parameters
-\footnote{url{safecurves.cr.yp.to}}.
+\footnote{\url{safecurves.cr.yp.to}}.
The authors of this paper include configurations and recommendations
with and without ECC - the reader may choose to adopt those settings
as he finds best suited to his environment. The authors will not make
MACs: Do not use SHA1. Why? XXX insert literature . BSI/ ENISA page XXX
Chaining mode: CTR, GCM, CCM (in this order). XXX add reference to literature XXX
ciphers: XXX add reference to literature XXX
-Key Exchange: ECDHE_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits) XXX FIXME: why? references to literature XXX
+Key Exchange: ECDHE\_RSA, DHE\_RSA, ECDHE\_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits) XXX FIXME: why? references to literature XXX
\subsubsection{Configuration B}
MACs: SHA1: allowed
Chaining mode: GCM, CCM, CBC.
ciphers: XXX add reference to literature XXX
-Key Exchange: ECDHE_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits)
+Key Exchange: ECDHE\_RSA, DHE\_RSA, ECDHE\_ECDSA, (be careful about DH parameters . We want > 2048 bits)