-\subsubsection{Overview of SSL Server settings}
-
-
-Most Server software (Webservers, Mail servers, etc.) can be configured to prefer certain cipher suites over others.
-We followed the recommendations by Ivan Ristic's SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices\footnote{\url{https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html}} document (see section 2.2 "Use Secure Protocols") and arrived at a list of recommended cipher suites for SSL enabled servers.
-
-Following Ivan Ristic's adivce we arrived at a categorisation of cipher suites.
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tabular}{lllll}
-\cmidrule[\heavyrulewidth]{2-5}
-& \textbf{Version} & \textbf{KeyEx} & \textbf{Cipher} & \textbf{MAC} \\\cmidrule(lr){2-5}
-\cellcolor{green}prefer & TLS 1.2 & DHE\_DSS & AES\_256\_GCM & SHA384 \\
- & & DHE\_RSA & AES\_256\_CCM & SHA256 \\
- & & ECDHE\_ECDSA & AES\_256\_CBC & \\
- & & ECDHE\_RSA & & \\
- & & & & \\
-\cellcolor{orange}consider & TLS 1.1 & DH\_DSS & AES\_128\_GCM & SHA \\
- & TLS 1.0 & DH\_RSA & AES\_128\_CCM & \\
- & & ECDH\_ECDSA & AES\_128\_CBC & \\
- & & ECDH\_RSA & CAMELLIA\_256\_CBC & \\
- & & RSA & CAMELLIA\_128\_CBC & \\
- & & & & \\
-\cellcolor{red}avoid
-& SSL 3.0 & NULL & NULL & NULL \\
- & & DH\_anon & RC4\_128 & MD5 \\
- & & ECDH\_anon & 3DES\_EDE\_CBC & \\
- & & & DES\_CBC & \\
- & & & & \\
-\cellcolor{blue}{\color{white}special }
-& & PSK & CAMELLIA\_256\_GCM & \\
- & & DHE\_PSK & CAMELLIA\_128\_GCM & \\
- & & RSA\_PSK & ARIA\_256\_GCM & \\
- & & ECDHE\_PSK & ARIA\_256\_CBC & \\
- & & & ARIA\_128\_GCM & \\
- & & & ARIA\_128\_CBC & \\
- & & & SEED & \\
-\cmidrule[\heavyrulewidth]{2-5}
-\end{tabular}
-\end{center}
-
-A remark on the ``consider'' section: the BSI (Federal office for information security, Germany) recommends in its technical report TR-02102-2\footnote{\url{https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR02102/BSI-TR-02102-2_pdf.html}} to \textbf{avoid} non-ephemeral\footnote{Ephemeral keys are session keys which are destroyed upon termination of the encrypted session. In TLS/SSL, they are realized by the DHE cipher suites. } keys for any communication which might contain personal or sensitive data. In this document, we follow BSI's advice and therefore only keep cipher suites containing (EC)DH\textbf{E} (ephemeral) variants. System administrators, who can not use forward secrecy can still use the cipher suites in the ``consider'' section. We however, do not recommend them in this document.
-
-%% NOTE: s/forward secrecy/perfect forward secrecy???
-
-Note that the entries marked as ``special'' are cipher suites which are not common to all clients (webbrowsers etc).
-
-
-\subsubsection{Tested clients}
-
-Next we tested the cipher suites above on the following clients:
-
-%% NOTE: we need to test with more systems!!
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Chrome 30.0.1599.101 Mac OS X 10.9
-\item Safari 7.0 Mac OS X 10.9
-\item Firefox 25.0 Mac OS X 10.9
-\item Internet Explorer 10 Windows 7
-\item Apple iOS 7.0.3
-\end{itemize}
-
-
-The result of testing the cipher suites with these clients gives us a preference order as shown in table \ref{table:prefOrderCipherSuites}.
-Should a client not be able to use a specific cipher suite, it will fall back to the next possible entry as given by the ordering.
-
-\begin{table}[h]
-\centering\small
- \begin{tabular}{cllcccc}
- \toprule
- \textbf{Pref} & \textbf{Cipher Suite} & \textbf{ID} & \multicolumn{4}{l}{\textbf{Supported by}}\\
- \cmidrule(lr){4-7}
- & \textbf{OpenSSL Name} & & Chrome & FF & IE & Safari \\
- \cmidrule(lr){1-7}
- \phantom{0}1 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384| & \verb|0x009f| & \no & \no & \no & \no \\
- & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- \phantom{0}2 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384| & \verb|0xC024| & \no & \no & \no & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- & \verb|ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384| & & &&&\\
- \phantom{0}3 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384| & \verb|0xC028| & \no & \no & \no & \yes \\
- & \verb|ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- \phantom{0}4 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256| & \verb|0x006B| & \yes & \no & \no & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256| & & &&&\\
- \phantom{0}5 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0xC00A| & \yes & \yes & \yes & \yes \\
- & \verb|ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- \phantom{0}6 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0xC014| & \yes & \yes & \yes & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- & \verb|ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\
- \phantom{0}7 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0039| & \yes & \yes & \no & \yes \\
- & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- \phantom{0}8 & \verb|TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0038| & \no & \yes & \yes & \no \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- & \verb|DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\
- \phantom{0}9 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0088| & \no & \yes & \no & \no \\
- & \verb|DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- \phantom{}10 & \verb|TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0087| & \no & \yes & \no & \no \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
- & \verb|DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA| & & &&&\\
- \bottomrule
- \end{tabular}
-\caption{Preference order of cipher suites. All suites are supported by OpenSSL.}
-\label{table:prefOrderCipherSuites}
-\end{table}
-
-Note: the above table \ref{table:prefOrderCipherSuites} contains Elliptic curve key exchanges. There are currently strong doubts\footnote{\url{http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html}} concerning ECC.
-If unsure, remove the cipher suites starting with ECDHE in the table above.
-
-
-Based on this ordering, we can now define the corresponding settings for servers. We will start with the most common web servers.
+%\subsubsection{Overview of SSL Server settings}
+%
+%
+%Most Server software (Webservers, Mail servers, etc.) can be configured to prefer certain cipher suites over others.
+%We followed the recommendations by Ivan Ristic's SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices\footnote{\url{https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html}} document (see section 2.2 "Use Secure Protocols") and arrived at a list of recommended cipher suites for SSL enabled servers.
+%
+%Following Ivan Ristic's adivce we arrived at a categorisation of cipher suites.
+%
+%\begin{center}
+%\begin{tabular}{lllll}
+%\cmidrule[\heavyrulewidth]{2-5}
+%& \textbf{Version} & \textbf{KeyEx} & \textbf{Cipher} & \textbf{MAC} \\\cmidrule(lr){2-5}
+%\cellcolor{green}prefer & TLS 1.2 & DHE\_DSS & AES\_256\_GCM & SHA384 \\
+% & & DHE\_RSA & AES\_256\_CCM & SHA256 \\
+% & & ECDHE\_ECDSA & AES\_256\_CBC & \\
+% & & ECDHE\_RSA & & \\
+% & & & & \\
+%\cellcolor{orange}consider & TLS 1.1 & DH\_DSS & AES\_128\_GCM & SHA \\
+% & TLS 1.0 & DH\_RSA & AES\_128\_CCM & \\
+% & & ECDH\_ECDSA & AES\_128\_CBC & \\
+% & & ECDH\_RSA & CAMELLIA\_256\_CBC & \\
+% & & RSA & CAMELLIA\_128\_CBC & \\
+% & & & & \\
+%\cellcolor{red}avoid
+%& SSL 3.0 & NULL & NULL & NULL \\
+% & & DH\_anon & RC4\_128 & MD5 \\
+% & & ECDH\_anon & 3DES\_EDE\_CBC & \\
+% & & & DES\_CBC & \\
+% & & & & \\
+%\cellcolor{blue}{\color{white}special }
+%& & PSK & CAMELLIA\_256\_GCM & \\
+% & & DHE\_PSK & CAMELLIA\_128\_GCM & \\
+% & & RSA\_PSK & ARIA\_256\_GCM & \\
+% & & ECDHE\_PSK & ARIA\_256\_CBC & \\
+% & & & ARIA\_128\_GCM & \\
+% & & & ARIA\_128\_CBC & \\
+% & & & SEED & \\
+%\cmidrule[\heavyrulewidth]{2-5}
+%\end{tabular}
+%\end{center}
+%
+%A remark on the ``consider'' section: the BSI (Federal office for information security, Germany) recommends in its technical report TR-02102-2\footnote{\url{https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR02102/BSI-TR-02102-2_pdf.html}} to \textbf{avoid} non-ephemeral\footnote{Ephemeral keys are session keys which are destroyed upon termination of the encrypted session. In TLS/SSL, they are realized by the DHE cipher suites. } keys for any communication which might contain personal or sensitive data. In this document, we follow BSI's advice and therefore only keep cipher suites containing (EC)DH\textbf{E} (ephemeral) variants. System administrators, who can not use forward secrecy can still use the cipher suites in the ``consider'' section. We however, do not recommend them in this document.
+%
+%%% NOTE: s/forward secrecy/perfect forward secrecy???
+%
+%Note that the entries marked as ``special'' are cipher suites which are not common to all clients (webbrowsers etc).
+%
+%
+%\subsubsection{Tested clients}
+%
+%Next we tested the cipher suites above on the following clients:
+%
+%%% NOTE: we need to test with more systems!!
+%\begin{itemize}
+%\item Chrome 30.0.1599.101 Mac OS X 10.9
+%\item Safari 7.0 Mac OS X 10.9
+%\item Firefox 25.0 Mac OS X 10.9
+%\item Internet Explorer 10 Windows 7
+%\item Apple iOS 7.0.3
+%\end{itemize}
+%
+%
+%The result of testing the cipher suites with these clients gives us a preference order as shown in table \ref{table:prefOrderCipherSuites}.
+%Should a client not be able to use a specific cipher suite, it will fall back to the next possible entry as given by the ordering.
+%
+%\begin{table}[h]
+%\centering\small
+% \begin{tabular}{cllcccc}
+% \toprule
+% \textbf{Pref} & \textbf{Cipher Suite} & \textbf{ID} & \multicolumn{4}{l}{\textbf{Supported by}}\\
+% \cmidrule(lr){4-7}
+% & \textbf{OpenSSL Name} & & Chrome & FF & IE & Safari \\
+% \cmidrule(lr){1-7}
+% \phantom{0}1 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384| & \verb|0x009f| & \no & \no & \no & \no \\
+% & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% \phantom{0}2 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384| & \verb|0xC024| & \no & \no & \no & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% & \verb|ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384| & & &&&\\
+% \phantom{0}3 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384| & \verb|0xC028| & \no & \no & \no & \yes \\
+% & \verb|ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% \phantom{0}4 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256| & \verb|0x006B| & \yes & \no & \no & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256| & & &&&\\
+% \phantom{0}5 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0xC00A| & \yes & \yes & \yes & \yes \\
+% & \verb|ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% \phantom{0}6 & \verb|TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0xC014| & \yes & \yes & \yes & \yes \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% & \verb|ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\
+% \phantom{0}7 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0039| & \yes & \yes & \no & \yes \\
+% & \verb|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% \phantom{0}8 & \verb|TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0038| & \no & \yes & \yes & \no \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% & \verb|DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA| & & &&&\\
+% \phantom{0}9 & \verb|TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0088| & \no & \yes & \no & \no \\
+% & \verb|DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA| & & &&&\\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% \phantom{}10 & \verb|TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA| & \verb|0x0087| & \no & \yes & \no & \no \\\rowcolor{lightlightgray}
+% & \verb|DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA| & & &&&\\
+% \bottomrule
+% \end{tabular}
+%\caption{Preference order of cipher suites. All suites are supported by OpenSSL.}
+%\label{table:prefOrderCipherSuites}
+%\end{table}
+%
+%Note: the above table \ref{table:prefOrderCipherSuites} contains Elliptic curve key exchanges. There are currently strong doubts\footnote{\url{http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html}} concerning ECC.
+%If unsure, remove the cipher suites starting with ECDHE in the table above.
+%
+%
+%Based on this ordering, we can now define the corresponding settings for servers. We will start with the most common web servers.
git.bettercrypto.org / ach-master.git / commitdiff