3 Reported by: @Wims80 http://twitter.com/wims80/status/425770704693239808
4 Section Apache 2.1.1 recommends Rewrite instead of Redirect. Should be 301! (We correctly recommend 301 in the nginx section.)
8 OpenVPN cipher string doesn't work with 2.3.2 according to: @bong0.
9 Openvpn deprecated cipher string from the pdf. Therefore @bong0 hacked a script converting log messages to a sed expression https://gist.github.com/bong0/8941764 to run over an existing config file.
11 tls-cipher TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA:TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA:TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA:TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA:TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA:TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA
12 http://twitter.com/bong0/status/433306823001526272
13 http://twitter.com/bong0/status/433307537375387648
14 http://nopaste.info/d194fdaa78.html
15 guid string produces deprecated warning, no errors.
16 user's OpenVPN linked against OpenSSL 1.0.0. on Wheezy backport.
17 http://packages.debian.org/wheezy-backports/openvpn
21 I think we should add the supported SSL / TLS versions from Microsoft IIS.
22 http://twitter.com/gegch/status/439156512599322625
33 * Blackhat presentation on RSA problems!! -> ECC + ECDSA instead (recommendation of P.Zimmermann @STRINT workshop 2014)
35 * be consistent: 2048 RSA < 128 bit symmetric cipher strength. We should aim at 128+ bits symmetric strength. --> fix RSA 2048 in the document. Upgrade to 3072
37 * clean up 9.5 "chossing your own cipher"
39 * DDOS possibilities when we increase cyrpto security?? What about that? (--> LATER)
41 * write a Justification section to every setting, maybe have that later in the document.
43 * more focus on these sections:
45 - SSH : do we need a client subsection?
47 DONE * move the explanations to a later part of the document. Code snippets go *first* . The target group is sysadmins, must be easily copy & paste-able. Or find a different way so that they can easily use/read the document
49 DONE * Decide/Discuss recommended ciphers:
50 - DH parameters: what is our recommendation? >2048? >=2048? leave default (aka 1024)?
51 --> answer: we trust IETF/IKE as described in ECRYPT2
53 * comments from IAIK integrate (--> Aaron, check again if it was done)
54 DONE * SHA-1 section: write why it is a problem (--> Florian Mendel)
55 * PKI section (--> Thomas Schreck)
56 DONE * include OpenSSL names/IANA names into appendix (--> cm)
57 * Document RNG problem in Apache (--> Pepi)
58 DONE * Oracle ?? (--> Berg?? maybe . Or aaron: ask nic.at. Or link to T-Systems paper) --> T-Systems paper
59 DONE * DB2 (--> Berg. Or ask MLeyrer)
60 * Add AES128 to cipherStringA ?
61 * re-work chapter 2 (practical settings). Add lots of references to chapter 3 to get people interested in reading the theory.
62 * Document : add license
64 * compare gv.at Richtlinien with our recommendations.
68 People with outdated browsers (winXP) etc can't see our webpage. --> make a landing page explaining
69 how to updated the browser :)
71 Improve the wording on the cert.at Mailing list website so people don't get confused and know that they ended up on the correct site and list.
75 * translate to french and other european languages
80 * check all http:// URLs that we reference - check if they are also reachable via httpS:// and if so, change our reference
82 DONE * one-column layout: make page margins smaller
83 DONE * add large "DRAFT" letters on top of every page.
84 DONE make the git version number part of the document
85 DONE * Layout of sample code (lstisting format) : make it pretty!
86 Rendering in Firefox (inline) on Windows seems to be really messed up. What happenened?
88 * make every section like the Apache section (--> Aaron)
90 * make a HTML Version of the document. It is much easier to copy & paste from than from PDFs.
91 * Add Timestamp and git shorthash, not only date, to the title page of the document. Easier to check if you version of the document is current!
93 * \usepackage[utf8]{inputencoding} and all the other \usepackage things in applied-crypto-hardening.tex should be reviewed and we should take a look if it should't all be in common/\*.tex
95 * check epigraph: why is the "---" gone? Is it gone?
100 Requested by many people on Twitter
101 * Plain TXT version for use on headless servers
102 * HTML version for better reading in browsers and always up-to-date
103 * EPUB version for comfortable reading on tablets and ebook readers
109 * how to keep things up to date?
110 * how to automatically test compatibility?
111 * how to make sure that this document has the latest information on cipher strengths?
112 * !! GPG sign every PDF !!
113 * store the keys in DNS: see RFC 4398
120 add "we don't deal with ICS devices. Nonono"
123 src/commons/cipherstringb.tex --> remove the "!SRP"
126 Add "Dovecot" in front of 2.0.19apple1
127 Postfix section: smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1 instead of = 0
130 Postgresql: put in \%*\cipherstringB*) in the config!
131 Mysql: put in \%*\cipherstringB*) in the config!
132 Oracle: mark this as "we do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for Oracle so far"
133 DB2: mark this as "we do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for Oracle so far"
134 sed -i /IMB Db2/IBM DB2/g
136 * theory/PKI.tex line 120: "a previously created certificate" --> "a previously created key"!
140 Header Strict-Transport-Security "... includeSubDomains": we need to meed to mention that this can be a big pitfall.
141 Also do some more research on this!
142 For example: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec#section-6.1
143 fix lighttpd HTTP redirection and env vars
144 lighthttpd: ssl.ec-curve = "secp384"
145 ssl.dh-file = "/etc/lighttpd/dhparams-group16.pem"
146 ssl.ec-curve = "secp384r1"
149 keep it "Howto" not "How-to"
152 fix the subsubsection{XMPP/ Jabber} part. There seems to be a mix up here ? Maybe? --> check again
155 openssh - remark that ServerKeyBits might still be useful. Add a note that sometimes old keys are very very old and 1024 bits.
158 mention that sslscan (the tool) does not understand all cipherstrings! For example SHA2-\* is missing
159 --> recommend something better
161 - tools -> section SSL \& TLS: "lever your https" --> that's not a sentence. Fix it
162 - make this more uniform: the \url in the itemized list should always be either always at the beginnig or always at the end.
165 check the formatting of \cite[chapter16]{ii2011ecrypt}
166 same section: group 19-21 (256--521 bit ECC )... we need to mention it! We can not ignore it!
168 * cipher\_suites/architecture.tex:
169 IANA nomencalture part: make a reference to the appendix here
171 * .gitignore: add title.log
174 * epigraph balance between freedom and security is a delicate one --> remove this epigraph. It's not so fitting.
177 * re-write PKI section: make it *much* shorter. Reference: https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pkitutorial.pdf and
178 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509#Problems_with_certificate_authorities.
180 * scan our local region of the internet for https/smtp/imaps/pop3s
184 - key management , key life cycle
186 - common / default passphrases
190 * Wish List for software vendors?
191 * sweet spot, wo koennen wir was sinnvoll machen, was waere zu viel (8192 bit keys...)
194 1. document the abstract needs that we have for the cipher settings (HSTS etc)
195 Then find the best cipher setting strings per se
196 Only then put it to all servers and keep it rather uniformely (as much as possible)
200 * Test especially with non-Debian-OS!
202 * Test with more clients and other OSes than OSX / iPhone!!
207 - Playstation und XBox? --> LATER!
210 - Windows Phone 7 ???
212 - chapter owner makes a test setup
213 - tested by: XXX , on: $date. Screenshot of SSLlabs/ $testtool. (checktls.com)
215 * document (cite) EVERYTHING! Why we chose certain values. References, references, references. Otherwise it does not count!
217 DONE * .bib file is completely wrong. Make good citations/references. Add books: Schneier, ...
218 * !! important: add the version string to everything that we tested!!
221 - security specialists / freaks who want the very best settings
222 - should as many clients work with the settings as possible
223 * look at TLS1.2 specs and really check if we want all of these settings
226 Practical settings section
228 Definitely still missing these subsubsections:
229 * Exchange Server ?? (--> bei M$ angefragt, Evtl. Beitrag von A-Trust)
231 DONE * Exim4 (-> Adi & Wolfgang Breya)
232 DONE * Checkpoint (-> cm)
233 * Asa / Palo Alto (-> Azet)
234 * Terminal Server (VNC ), ??
237 --> verweise auf die xmpp community bzw. auf xmpp.net verweisen.
238 Empfehlung: unbedingt ejabberd updaten!!
241 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
242 * whatsapp --> man kann nichts machen, out of scope
243 * Lync: == SIP von M$.
244 * Skype: man kann ncihts machen, out of scope.
245 * Wi-Fi APs, 802.1X, ... ???? --> out of scope
251 * L2TP over IPSec -> egal
254 * DNSSec ?? Verweis auf BCPxxx --> out of scope
256 What happens at the IETF at the moment?
257 * TOR?? --> out of scope
258 * S/Mime --> nachsehen, gibt es BCPs? (--> Ramin)
259 * TrueCrypt, LUKS, FileVault, etc ---> out of scope
260 * AFS -> out of scope
261 * Kerberos --> out of scope
262 * NNTP -> out of scope
263 * NTPs tlsdate -> out of scope
264 * BGP / OSPF --> out of scope
265 * irc,silc --> out of scope
266 !! * IPMI/ILO/RAC: Java --> important. Empfehlung: nie ins Internet, nur in ein eigenes mgmt VLAN, das via VPN erreichbar ist!!
267 * LDAP -> out of scope
268 * RADIUS? -> maybe later...
269 * Moxa , APC, und co... ICS . Ethernet to serial --> out of scope
271 * rsyslog --> out of scope
272 * ARP bei v6 spoofing -> out of scope
273 * tinc?? -> out of scope
274 * rsync -> nur ueber ssh fahren ausser public web mirrors
275 * telnets -> out of scope
276 * ftps -> out of scope
277 !! * seclayer-tcp --> review von Posch & co.
278 seclayer-tcp 3495/udp # securitylayer over tcp
279 seclayer-tcp 3495/tcp # securitylayer over tcp
281 * plesk -> out of scope
282 * phpmyadmin --> haengt am apache, out of scope
283 * DSL modems -> out of scope
284 * UPnP, natPmp --> out of scope
285 * SAML federated auth providers (e.g., all the REFEDS folks (https://refeds.org/)), including InCommon (http://www.incommon.org/federation/metadata.html)
286 https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB2/TrustManagement (idea by Joe St. Sauver)
288 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
297 DONE - add two, three sentences
298 DONE - mention HaveGED
299 DONE - embedded devices are a problem
312 * Windows Active Directory
313 DONE * SRP: not part of this document. But we did not exclude it in our cipher string :)
314 DONE * \cipherA , \cipherB setting ---> does not work in our \begin{listing} environment --> maybe there is a different listing environment or use awk/sed/make/perl/python
315 * What about 3270 terminal emulation? How to do crypto there? Can we? ( --> IBM sec. Stammtisch. Aaron)
318 * client/users-guide:
320 * ssh client settings
322 * public key infrastructure
323 * certificate handling