6 * be consistent: 2048 RSA < 128 bit symmetric cipher strength. We should aim at 128+ bits symmetric strength. --> fix RSA 2048 in the document. Upgrade to 3072
8 * clean up 9.5 "chossing your own cipher"
10 * DDOS possibilities when we increase cyrpto security?? What about that? (--> LATER)
12 * write a Justification section to every setting, maybe have that later in the document.
14 * more focus on these sections:
16 - SSH : do we need a client subsection?
18 DONE * move the explanations to a later part of the document. Code snippets go *first* . The target group is sysadmins, must be easily copy & paste-able. Or find a different way so that they can easily use/read the document
20 DONE * Decide/Discuss recommended ciphers:
21 - DH parameters: what is our recommendation? >2048? >=2048? leave default (aka 1024)?
22 --> answer: we trust IETF/IKE as described in ECRYPT2
24 * comments from IAIK integrate (--> Aaron, check again if it was done)
25 DONE * SHA-1 section: write why it is a problem (--> Florian Mendel)
26 * PKI section (--> Thomas Schreck)
27 DONE * include OpenSSL names/IANA names into appendix (--> cm)
28 * Document RNG problem in Apache (--> Pepi)
29 DONE * Oracle ?? (--> Berg?? maybe . Or aaron: ask nic.at. Or link to T-Systems paper) --> T-Systems paper
30 DONE * DB2 (--> Berg. Or ask MLeyrer)
31 * Add AES128 to cipherStringA ?
32 * re-work chapter 2 (practical settings). Add lots of references to chapter 3 to get people interested in reading the theory.
33 * Document : add license
35 * compare gv.at Richtlinien with our recommendations.
39 People with outdated browsers (winXP) etc can't see our webpage. --> make a landing page explaining
40 how to updated the browser :)
46 * check all http:// URLs that we reference - check if they are also reachable via httpS:// and if so, change our reference
48 DONE * one-column layout: make page margins smaller
49 DONE * add large "DRAFT" letters on top of every page.
50 DONE make the git version number part of the document
51 DONE * Layout of sample code (lstisting format) : make it pretty!
52 Rendering in Firefox (inline) on Windows seems to be really messed up. What happenened?
54 * make every section like the Apache section (--> Aaron)
56 * make a HTML Version of the document. It is much easier to copy & paste from than from PDFs.
57 * Add Timestamp and git shorthash, not only date, to the title page of the document. Easier to check if you version of the document is current!
59 * \usepackage[utf8]{inputencoding} and all the other \usepackage things in applied-crypto-hardening.tex should be reviewed and we should take a look if it should't all be in common/\*.tex
61 * check epigraph: why is the "---" gone? Is it gone?
66 Requested by many people on Twitter
67 * Plain TXT version for use on headless servers
68 * HTML version for better reading in browsers and always up-to-date
69 * EPUB version for comfortable reading on tablets and ebook readers
75 * how to keep things up to date?
76 * how to automatically test compatibility?
77 * how to make sure that this document has the latest information on cipher strengths?
78 * !! GPG sign every PDF !!
79 * store the keys in DNS: see RFC 4398
86 add "we don't deal with ICS devices. Nonono"
89 src/commons/cipherstringb.tex --> remove the "!SRP"
92 Add "Dovecot" in front of 2.0.19apple1
93 Postfix section: smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1 instead of = 0
96 Postgresql: put in \%*\cipherstringB*) in the config!
97 Mysql: put in \%*\cipherstringB*) in the config!
98 Oracle: mark this as "we do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for Oracle so far"
99 DB2: mark this as "we do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for Oracle so far"
102 Header Strict-Transport-Security "... includeSubDomains": we need to meed to mention that this can be a big pitfall.
103 Also do some more research on this!
104 For example: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec#section-6.1
107 fix the subsubsection{XMPP/ Jabber} part. There seems to be a mix up here ? Maybe? --> check again
110 openssh - remark that ServerKeyBits might still be useful. Add a note that sometimes old keys are very very old and 1024 bits.
113 mention that sslscan (the tool) does not understand all cipherstrings! For example SHA2-\* is missing
114 --> recommend something better
116 - tools -> section SSL \& TLS: "lever your https" --> that's not a sentence. Fix it
117 - make this more uniform: the \url in the itemized list should always be either always at the beginnig or always at the end.
120 check the formatting of \cite[chapter16]{ii2011ecrypt}
121 same section: group 19-21 (256--521 bit ECC )... we need to mention it! We can not ignore it!
123 * cipher\_suites/architecture.tex:
124 IANA nomencalture part: make a reference to the appendix here
126 * .gitignore: add title.log
129 * epigraph balance between freedom and security is a delicate one --> remove this epigraph. It's not so fitting.
132 * re-write PKI section: make it *much* shorter. Reference: https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pkitutorial.pdf and
133 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509#Problems_with_certificate_authorities.
135 * scan our local region of the internet for https/smtp/imaps/pop3s
139 - key management , key life cycle
141 - common / default passphrases
145 * Wish List for software vendors?
146 * sweet spot, wo koennen wir was sinnvoll machen, was waere zu viel (8192 bit keys...)
149 1. document the abstract needs that we have for the cipher settings (HSTS etc)
150 Then find the best cipher setting strings per se
151 Only then put it to all servers and keep it rather uniformely (as much as possible)
155 * Test especially with non-Debian-OS!
157 * Test with more clients and other OSes than OSX / iPhone!!
162 - Playstation und XBox? --> LATER!
165 - Windows Phone 7 ???
167 - chapter owner makes a test setup
168 - tested by: XXX , on: $date. Screenshot of SSLlabs/ $testtool. (checktls.com)
170 * document (cite) EVERYTHING! Why we chose certain values. References, references, references. Otherwise it does not count!
172 DONE * .bib file is completely wrong. Make good citations/references. Add books: Schneier, ...
173 * !! important: add the version string to everything that we tested!!
176 - security specialists / freaks who want the very best settings
177 - should as many clients work with the settings as possible
178 * look at TLS1.2 specs and really check if we want all of these settings
181 Practical settings section
183 Definitely still missing these subsubsections:
184 * Exchange Server ?? (--> bei M$ angefragt, Evtl. Beitrag von A-Trust)
186 DONE * Exim4 (-> Adi & Wolfgang Breya)
187 DONE * Checkpoint (-> cm)
188 * Asa / Palo Alto (-> Azet)
189 * Terminal Server (VNC ), ??
192 --> verweise auf die xmpp community bzw. auf xmpp.net verweisen.
193 Empfehlung: unbedingt ejabberd updaten!!
196 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
197 * whatsapp --> man kann nichts machen, out of scope
198 * Lync: == SIP von M$.
199 * Skype: man kann ncihts machen, out of scope.
200 * Wi-Fi APs, 802.1X, ... ???? --> out of scope
206 * L2TP over IPSec -> egal
209 * DNSSec ?? Verweis auf BCPxxx --> out of scope
211 What happens at the IETF at the moment?
212 * TOR?? --> out of scope
213 * S/Mime --> nachsehen, gibt es BCPs? (--> Ramin)
214 * TrueCrypt, LUKS, FileVault, etc ---> out of scope
215 * AFS -> out of scope
216 * Kerberos --> out of scope
217 * NNTP -> out of scope
218 * NTPs tlsdate -> out of scope
219 * BGP / OSPF --> out of scope
220 * irc,silc --> out of scope
221 !! * IPMI/ILO/RAC: Java --> important. Empfehlung: nie ins Internet, nur in ein eigenes mgmt VLAN, das via VPN erreichbar ist!!
222 * LDAP -> out of scope
223 * RADIUS? -> maybe later...
224 * Moxa , APC, und co... ICS . Ethernet to serial --> out of scope
226 * rsyslog --> out of scope
227 * ARP bei v6 spoofing -> out of scope
228 * tinc?? -> out of scope
229 * rsync -> nur ueber ssh fahren ausser public web mirrors
230 * telnets -> out of scope
231 * ftps -> out of scope
232 !! * seclayer-tcp --> review von Posch & co.
233 seclayer-tcp 3495/udp # securitylayer over tcp
234 seclayer-tcp 3495/tcp # securitylayer over tcp
236 * plesk -> out of scope
237 * phpmyadmin --> haengt am apache, out of scope
238 * DSL modems -> out of scope
239 * UPnP, natPmp --> out of scope
240 * SAML federated auth providers (e.g., all the REFEDS folks (https://refeds.org/)), including InCommon (http://www.incommon.org/federation/metadata.html)
241 https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB2/TrustManagement (idea by Joe St. Sauver)
243 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
252 DONE - add two, three sentences
253 DONE - mention HaveGED
254 DONE - embedded devices are a problem
267 * Windows Active Directory
268 DONE * SRP: not part of this document. But we did not exclude it in our cipher string :)
269 DONE * \cipherA , \cipherB setting ---> does not work in our \begin{listing} environment --> maybe there is a different listing environment or use awk/sed/make/perl/python
270 * What about 3270 terminal emulation? How to do crypto there? Can we? ( --> IBM sec. Stammtisch. Aaron)
273 * client/users-guide:
275 * ssh client settings
277 * public key infrastructure
278 * certificate handling