6 * be consistent: 2048 RSA < 128 bit symmetric cipher strength. We should aim at 128+ bits symmetric strength. --> fix RSA 2048 in the document. Upgrade to 3072
8 * clean up 9.5 "chossing your own cipher"
10 * DDOS possibilities when we increase cyrpto security?? What about that? (--> LATER)
12 * write a Justification section to every setting, maybe have that later in the document.
14 * more focus on these sections:
16 - SSH : do we need a client subsection?
18 DONE * move the explanations to a later part of the document. Code snippets go *first* . The target group is sysadmins, must be easily copy & paste-able. Or find a different way so that they can easily use/read the document
20 DONE * Decide/Discuss recommended ciphers:
21 - DH parameters: what is our recommendation? >2048? >=2048? leave default (aka 1024)?
22 --> answer: we trust IETF/IKE as described in ECRYPT2
24 * comments from IAIK integrate (--> Aaron, check again if it was done)
25 DONE * SHA-1 section: write why it is a problem (--> Florian Mendel)
26 * PKI section (--> Thomas Schreck)
27 DONE * include OpenSSL names/IANA names into appendix (--> cm)
28 * Document RNG problem in Apache (--> Pepi)
29 DONE * Oracle ?? (--> Berg?? maybe . Or aaron: ask nic.at. Or link to T-Systems paper) --> T-Systems paper
30 DONE * DB2 (--> Berg. Or ask MLeyrer)
31 * Add AES128 to cipherStringA ?
32 * re-work chapter 2 (practical settings). Add lots of references to chapter 3 to get people interested in reading the theory.
37 People with outdated browsers (winXP) etc can't see our webpage. --> make a landing page explaining
38 how to updated the browser :)
44 DONE * one-column layout: make page margins smaller
45 DONE * add large "DRAFT" letters on top of every page.
46 DONE make the git version number part of the document
47 DONE * Layout of sample code (lstisting format) : make it pretty!
48 Rendering in Firefox (inline) on Windows seems to be really messed up. What happenened?
50 * make every section like the Apache section (--> Aaron)
52 * make a HTML Version of the document. It is much easier to copy & paste from than from PDFs.
53 * Add Timestamp and git shorthash, not only date, to the title page of the document. Easier to check if you version of the document is current!
58 Requested by many people on Twitter
59 * Plain TXT version for use on headless servers
60 * HTML version for better reading in browsers and always up-to-date
61 * EPUB version for comfortable reading on tablets and ebook readers
67 * how to keep things up to date?
68 * how to automatically test compatibility?
69 * how to make sure that this document has the latest information on cipher strengths?
70 * !! GPG sign every PDF !!
71 * store the keys in DNS: see RFC 4398
78 Header Strict-Transport-Security "... includeSubDomains": we need to meed to mention that this can be a big pitfall.
79 Also do some more research on this!
80 For example: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec#section-6.1
82 * scan our local region of the internet for https/smtp/imaps/pop3s
86 - key management , key life cycle
88 - common / default passphrases
92 * Wish List for software vendors?
93 * sweet spot, wo koennen wir was sinnvoll machen, was waere zu viel (8192 bit keys...)
96 1. document the abstract needs that we have for the cipher settings (HSTS etc)
97 Then find the best cipher setting strings per se
98 Only then put it to all servers and keep it rather uniformely (as much as possible)
102 * Test especially with non-Debian-OS!
104 * Test with more clients and other OSes than OSX / iPhone!!
109 - Playstation und XBox? --> LATER!
112 - Windows Phone 7 ???
114 - chapter owner makes a test setup
115 - tested by: XXX , on: $date. Screenshot of SSLlabs/ $testtool. (checktls.com)
117 * document (cite) EVERYTHING! Why we chose certain values. References, references, references. Otherwise it does not count!
119 DONE * .bib file is completely wrong. Make good citations/references. Add books: Schneier, ...
120 * !! important: add the version string to everything that we tested!!
123 - security specialists / freaks who want the very best settings
124 - should as many clients work with the settings as possible
125 * look at TLS1.2 specs and really check if we want all of these settings
128 Practical settings section
130 Definitely still missing these subsubsections:
131 * Exchange Server ?? (--> bei M$ angefragt, Evtl. Beitrag von A-Trust)
133 DONE * Exim4 (-> Adi & Wolfgang Breya)
134 DONE * Checkpoint (-> cm)
135 * Asa / Palo Alto (-> Azet)
136 * Terminal Server (VNC ), ??
139 --> verweise auf die xmpp community bzw. auf xmpp.net verweisen.
140 Empfehlung: unbedingt ejabberd updaten!!
143 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
144 * whatsapp --> man kann nichts machen, out of scope
145 * Lync: == SIP von M$.
146 * Skype: man kann ncihts machen, out of scope.
147 * Wi-Fi APs, 802.1X, ... ???? --> out of scope
153 * L2TP over IPSec -> egal
156 * DNSSec ?? Verweis auf BCPxxx --> out of scope
158 What happens at the IETF at the moment?
159 * TOR?? --> out of scope
160 * S/Mime --> nachsehen, gibt es BCPs? (--> Ramin)
161 * TrueCrypt, LUKS, FileVault, etc ---> out of scope
162 * AFS -> out of scope
163 * Kerberos --> out of scope
164 * NNTP -> out of scope
165 * NTPs tlsdate -> out of scope
166 * BGP / OSPF --> out of scope
167 * irc,silc --> out of scope
168 !! * IPMI/ILO/RAC: Java --> important. Empfehlung: nie ins Internet, nur in ein eigenes mgmt VLAN, das via VPN erreichbar ist!!
169 * LDAP -> out of scope
170 * RADIUS? -> maybe later...
171 * Moxa , APC, und co... ICS . Ethernet to serial --> out of scope
173 * rsyslog --> out of scope
174 * ARP bei v6 spoofing -> out of scope
175 * tinc?? -> out of scope
176 * rsync -> nur ueber ssh fahren ausser public web mirrors
177 * telnets -> out of scope
178 * ftps -> out of scope
179 !! * seclayer-tcp --> review von Posch & co.
180 seclayer-tcp 3495/udp # securitylayer over tcp
181 seclayer-tcp 3495/tcp # securitylayer over tcp
183 * plesk -> out of scope
184 * phpmyadmin --> haengt am apache, out of scope
185 * DSL modems -> out of scope
186 * UPnP, natPmp --> out of scope
187 * SAML federated auth providers (e.g., all the REFEDS folks (https://refeds.org/)), including InCommon (http://www.incommon.org/federation/metadata.html)
188 https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB2/TrustManagement (idea by Joe St. Sauver)
190 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
199 DONE - add two, three sentences
200 DONE - mention HaveGED
201 DONE - embedded devices are a problem
214 * Windows Active Directory
215 DONE * SRP: not part of this document. But we did not exclude it in our cipher string :)
216 DONE * \cipherA , \cipherB setting ---> does not work in our \begin{listing} environment --> maybe there is a different listing environment or use awk/sed/make/perl/python
217 * What about 3270 terminal emulation? How to do crypto there? Can we? ( --> IBM sec. Stammtisch. Aaron)
220 * client/users-guide:
222 * ssh client settings
224 * public key infrastructure
225 * certificate handling