9 * clean up 9.5 "chossing your own cipher"
11 * DDOS possibilities when we increase cyrpto security?? What about that? (--> LATER)
13 * write a Justification section to every setting, maybe have that later in the document.
15 * more focus on these sections:
17 - SSH : do we need a client subsection?
19 DONE * move the explanations to a later part of the document. Code snippets go *first* . The target group is sysadmins, must be easily copy & paste-able. Or find a different way so that they can easily use/read the document
21 DONE * Decide/Discuss recommended ciphers:
22 - DH parameters: what is our recommendation? >2048? >=2048? leave default (aka 1024)?
23 --> answer: we trust IETF/IKE as described in ECRYPT2
25 * comments from IAIK integrate (--> Aaron, check again if it was done)
26 * SHA-1 section: write why it is a problem (--> Florian Mendel)
27 * PKI section (--> Thomas Schreck)
28 DONE * include OpenSSL names/IANA names into appendix (--> cm)
29 * Document RNG problem in Apache (--> Pepi)
30 DONE * Oracle ?? (--> Berg?? maybe . Or aaron: ask nic.at. Or link to T-Systems paper) --> T-Systems paper
31 DONE * DB2 (--> Berg. Or ask MLeyrer)
32 * Add AES128 to cipherStringA ?
33 * re-work chapter 2 (practical settings). Add lots of references to chapter 3 to get people interested in reading the theory.
39 DONE * one-column layout: make page margins smaller
40 DONE * add large "DRAFT" letters on top of every page.
41 DONE make the git version number part of the document
42 DONE * Layout of sample code (lstisting format) : make it pretty!
43 Rendering in Firefox (inline) on Windows seems to be really messed up. What happenened?
45 * make every section like the Apache section (--> Aaron)
47 * make a HTML Version of the document. It is much easier to copy & paste from than from PDFs.
54 * how to keep things up to date?
55 * how to automatically test compatibility?
56 * how to make sure that this document has the latest information on cipher strengths?
57 * !! GPG sign every PDF !!
58 * store the keys in DNS: see RFC 4398
63 * scan our local region of the internet for https/smtp/imaps/pop3s
67 - key management , key life cycle
69 - common / default passphrases
73 * Wish List for software vendors?
74 * sweet spot, wo koennen wir was sinnvoll machen, was waere zu viel (8192 bit keys...)
77 1. document the abstract needs that we have for the cipher settings (HSTS etc)
78 Then find the best cipher setting strings per se
79 Only then put it to all servers and keep it rather uniformely (as much as possible)
83 * Test with more clients and other OSes than OSX / iPhone!!
88 - Playstation und XBox? --> LATER!
93 - chapter owner makes a test setup
94 - tested by: XXX , on: $date. Screenshot of SSLlabs/ $testtool. (checktls.com)
96 * document (cite) EVERYTHING! Why we chose certain values. Referneces, references, references. Otherwise it does not count!
98 DONE * .bib file is completely wrong. Make good citations/references. Add books: Schneier, ...
99 * !! important: add the version string to everything that we tested!!
102 - security specialists / freaks who want the very best settings
103 - should as many clients work with the settings as possible
104 * look at TLS1.2 specs and really check if we want all of these settings
107 Practical settings section
109 Definitely still missing these subsubsections:
110 * Exchange Server ?? (--> bei M$ angefragt, Evtl. Beitrag von A-Trust)
112 DONE * Exim4 (-> Adi & Wolfgang Breya)
113 DONE * Checkpoint (-> cm)
114 * Asa / Palo Alto (-> Azet)
115 * Terminal Server (VNC ), ??
118 --> verweise auf die xmpp community bzw. auf xmpp.net verweisen.
119 Empfehlung: unbedingt ejabberd updaten!!
122 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
123 * whatsapp --> man kann nichts machen, out of scope
124 * Lync: == SIP von M$.
125 * Skype: man kann ncihts machen, out of scope.
126 * Wi-Fi APs, 802.1X, ... ???? --> out of scope
132 * L2TP over IPSec -> egal
135 * DNSSec ?? Verweis auf BCPxxx --> out of scope
137 What happens at the IETF at the moment?
138 * TOR?? --> out of scope
139 * S/Mime --> nachsehen, gibt es BCPs? (--> Ramin)
140 * TrueCrypt, LUKS, FileVault, etc ---> out of scope
141 * AFS -> out of scope
142 * Kerberos --> out of scope
143 * NNTP -> out of scope
144 * NTPs tlsdate -> out of scope
145 * BGP / OSPF --> out of scope
146 * irc,silc --> out of scope
147 !! * IPMI/ILO/RAC: Java --> important. Empfehlung: nie ins Internet, nur in ein eigenes mgmt VLAN, das via VPN erreichbar ist!!
148 * LDAP -> out of scope
149 * RADIUS? -> maybe later...
150 * Moxa , APC, und co... ICS . Ethernet to serial --> out of scope
152 * rsyslog --> out of scope
153 * ARP bei v6 spoofing -> out of scope
154 * tinc?? -> out of scope
155 * rsync -> nur ueber ssh fahren ausser public web mirrors
156 * telnets -> out of scope
157 * ftps -> out of scope
158 !! * seclayer-tcp --> review von Posch & co.
159 seclayer-tcp 3495/udp # securitylayer over tcp
160 seclayer-tcp 3495/tcp # securitylayer over tcp
162 * plesk -> out of scope
163 * phpmyadmin --> haengt am apache, out of scope
164 * DSL modems -> out of scope
165 * UPnP, natPmp --> out of scope
166 * SAML federated auth providers (e.g., all the REFEDS folks (https://refeds.org/)), including InCommon (http://www.incommon.org/federation/metadata.html)
167 https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB2/TrustManagement (idea by Joe St. Sauver)
169 ----- snip ---- all protocols that we looked at --- snip ----
178 DONE - add two, three sentences
179 DONE - mention HaveGED
180 DONE - embedded devices are a problem
192 Requested by many people on Twitter
193 * Plain TXT version for use on headless servers
194 * HTML version for better reading in browsers and always up-to-date
195 * EPUB version for comfortable reading on tablets and ebook readers
201 * Windows Active Directory
202 * SRP: not part of this document
203 DONE * \cipherA , \cipherB setting ---> does not work in our \begin{listing} environment --> maybe there is a different listing environment or use awk/sed/make/perl/python
204 * What about 3270 terminal emulation? How to do crypto there? Can we? ( --> IBM sec. Stammtisch. Aaron)